University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
MPA/MPP/MPFM Capstone Projects

James W. Martin School of Public Policy and
Administration

2012

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: An
Investigation into the Determinants of Funds Awarded to the
States
Kaitlin Bromann
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds
Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Bromann, Kaitlin, "The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: An Investigation into the
Determinants of Funds Awarded to the States" (2012). MPA/MPP/MPFM Capstone Projects. 61.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/61

This Graduate Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the James W. Martin School of
Public Policy and Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in MPA/MPP/MPFM Capstone
Projects by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009
~

An Investigation into the
Determinants of Funds Awarded to States

Kaitlin Bromann
Capstone Project
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration
University of Kentucky
Spring 2012

Table of Contents
Executive Summary

2

Background

3

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Literature Review

7

Summary of Budgetary Theory
Congressional Dominance Theory
Electoral Vote Maximization Theory
Applied Analyses
Research Design

15

Data Collection
Research Model
Results

22

Discussion
Defense of Results
Conclusion

28

Caveats and Limitations
Opportunities for Future Research
References

31

Appendices

35

1

Executive Summary
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is one of the largest
government responses to an economic crisis in the history of the United States. The
purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of the total funds awarded to
states by federal agencies in the Recovery Act. A review of budgetary theory,
distributive politics, and electoral vote maximization theory provides context of
historical determinants of resource allocation by the federal government.
Then from this literature I develop a model including economic and political
variables. The dependent variable in my model is the total funds awarded to the
fifty states expressed per capita for thirty-four federal agencies between February
17, 2009 and December 31, 2011. I organize the data into a panel for 1700
observations and use regression with agency fixed-effects to control for the average
differences across agencies in observable and unobservable ways. I also cluster by
state because the variances vary systematically based on unobserved, correlated
state characteristics.
The analysis provides strong evidence that four of my chosen independent
variables affected the funds awarded in the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act. Economically, the total revenue growth of a state between 2007 and 2008 and
the amount of federal aid received per capita have positive and statistically
significant relationships with the amount of funds awarded. Politically, the
presidential election competitiveness of states and the number of Representatives
serving on the House Full Committee on Appropriations have negative and
statistically significant relationships with the dependent variable. The results
suggest that the awarding of funds in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
are consistent with the literature indicating that a combination of politics and
economics matter in allocating scarce resources among alternative uses.

2

I. Background
The economic recession that originated in the United States in 2007 and
quickly spread across the globe is now referred to as the ‘Great Recession’. The
unprecedented downturn and financial crisis prompted the United States
government to act to unblock the credit markets, provide banks with more capital,
and reduce the effects of the recession on its citizens.1 These actions were formally
adopted through the enactment of 1) the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, 2) the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, and finally 3) the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
The magnitude of the legislation was almost as unprecedented as the
magnitude of the recession that preceded. The Congressional Budget Office
estimates the total cost of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 as $124 billion2, $700 billion3, and $787 billion4 respectively for a total
price tag of $1.6 trillion. Therefore, the size and significance of these laws calls for
close examination of their implementation and effectiveness. The purpose of this
paper is to examine the determinants of the total funds awarded to the states
through the final—and perhaps most controversial—of the three pieces of
legislation, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
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Saving the system. Economist. pp.15-16.
CBOa report. H.R. 5140 The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. p.1
3
CBOb report. H.R. 1424 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. p.3
4
CBOc report. H.R. 1 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. p.1
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The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
President Barack Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA, Recovery Act, or Stimulus) into law on February 17, 2009, just five
weeks after he took the oath of office. It was the largest government response to an
economic crisis in the history of the United States and quickly captured the attention
of the American public because of its size, promise of improvement, and
exacerbation of partisan politics.5
Although the legislation drew criticism, many Americans agreed the
economy, the states, and the people needed help. In 2009, the economy was so bad
that 43 states faced budget gaps totaling more than $60 billion.6 The second quarter
of 2009 represented the worst year to year decline in total tax revenue for the
combined fifty states in the last 50 years at 16 percent.7 Given these daunting digits,
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman went so far as to say the bill was inadequate and that
the Administration did not ask for enough money.8
Using $787 billion, the Recovery Act had three main goals: to create and save
jobs, to spur economy activity and invest in long-term growth, and to foster
unprecedented levels of accountability and transparency in Recovery spending.9
These goals have been pursued through $288 billion in tax cuts and benefits, $224
billion of funding for entitlement programs, and $275 billion in contract, grant, and
loan awards.10
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Whatley, C. p.1
Chodrow et al. ““Does State Fiscal Relief During Recessions Increase Employment? Evidence from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act” p.20
7
Bradbury, K. “State Government Budgets and the Recovery Act” p.29
8
Krugman (Op-Ed)
9
Goals of the Recovery Act, http://www.recovery.gov/About/GetStarted/Pages/WhatisRecoveryAct.aspx .
10
Ibid.
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The allocation of funds for tax cuts and benefits and entitlement programs
was largely based on predetermined formulas. According to Whatley (2010), sixty
percent of the Recovery Act will go through state governments, which includes $140
billion in budget relief, $100 billion in formula allocation, education funds, social
safety net spending and infrastructure funds, and more than $60 billion in
competitive grant opportunities.11 Therefore, a majority of the Stimulus can be
explained using formulas for budget relief, Medicaid, education funds, and other
social programs.
My research focuses on the $275 billion that was awarded to the fifty states
through contracts, grants, and loans because these funds were not prearranged,
which provides an opportunity to analyze the awarding determinants. To be clear,
the three types of awards are defined in ARRA as follows; a grant is “an award of
financial assistance from a federal agency to a recipient to carry out a public project
or service authorized by a law of the United States,” a contract is “an agreement
between a company and the Federal government for the provision of products or
services,” and a loan is “a temporary provision of funds from a federal agency to a
recipient.”12
Before analyzing the awards, it is important to understand how these funds
are transferred to the states. First, Congress appropriates the stimulus funds to
federal agencies. Then the federal agencies either make the funds available to state
and local governments or send them directly to academia, businesses, or

11
12

Whatley,C. p. 386.
ARRA Glossary. http://www.recovery.gov/FAQ/Pages/glossaryHome.aspx#ghi
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organizations.13 Within the states, state agencies then select projects for the
funding. In my analysis, I am only concerned with what determined the initial
amount awarded to the states by the federal agencies, measured as the sum of funds
awarded by a federal agency to a prime recipient in that state.14 I do not to look at
the types of projects thereafter or even the final amount allocated because this is
either a function of state policy or bidding processes which I am not inquiring about.
Since the enactment of ARRA, several analyses have been completed
examining national and county level fund distributions. I aim to perform a more
targeted analysis of the determinants of ARRA funding by including up-to-date data
for funds awarded by agency to see if the results differ from prior findings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews literature on budgetary
theory, congressional dominance theory, electoral vote maximization theory and
looks at applied empirical analyses of federal fund allocation. Section III presents
the research design used for my analysis. Section IV provides the results of the
analysis and Section V draws conclusions, concedes the caveats and limitations, and
suggests opportunities for future research.

13
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How the Money Moves Overview. http://www.recovery.gov/About/RecoveryInAction/Pages/HowMoneyMoves.aspx
ARRA Glossary.
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II. Literature Review
Given the amount of scholarship on budgeting theory and distributive
politics, I cannot do justice here to the entire literature. Therefore, I limit this
review to studies that summarize the basic concepts most relevant to studying the
determinants of fund allocation by the federal government.

Summary of Budgetary Theory
V.O. Key (1940) writes the basic budgeting problem; “On what basis shall it
be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?” This means that
budget makers must decide how to allocate scarce means among alternative uses
because they will never have enough revenue to meet everyone’s requests. Since
1940 many competing theories in political, economic, and financial literature have
attempted to answer his question. In fact, my research question can be restated as,
“On what basis was it decided to award ARRA contract, grant, and loan dollars to
state A instead of state B?”
Aaron Wildavksy’s answer to Key’s question is that funds are allocated as
increases or decreases from last year’s allocation because of the political process.
Jones and McCaffery (1994) summarize the work of Wildavsky, who developed the
concept known as incrementalism which means budget makers rarely start a budget
completely from scratch. Instead, they look at last year’s budget and then focus on
small ranges of increases or decreases. From an agency perspective, Wildavsky
(1966) says these ranges are small because if agencies ask for too much money
compared to last year it may harm their credibility, and if they ask for too little they
7

will not receive adequate funds. From the legislative perspective, he says budgeting
is incremental because Congress works under time constraints and has limited
knowledge of agency operations. I imagine that Wildavsky would begin an analysis
of ARRA fund determinants by examining last year’s allocation of federal contracts,
grants, and loans to the states.

Congressional Dominance Theory
Including politics in decisions regarding the distribution of government
resources is known as distributive politics. Hamman (1997) defines distributive
politics as administrators deciding “who will be assisted, when they will be assisted,
and how much assistance they will receive from distributive types of programs,”
(Hamman 56). This administrative power of Congress and the Executive underlies
the discussion of the congressional dominance and electoral vote maximization
theories, two possible explanations of ARRA award distributions.
The congressional dominance theory describes Congress’s dominant
relationship with the bureaucracy and defines decision-making in Congress as selfinterested and specialized. According to Weingast (1984) and Moe (1987) the
congressional dominance theory is that Congress controls the bureaucracy. This
control comes from several sources. First, Weingast (1984) says that agencies
depend on Congress because Congress has the power to create new agencies and
appropriate funds. The theory also reflects politicians’ desires to be reelected.
Weingast elaborates that in order to increase their chances of reelection, politicians
gain influence over a set of issues that are relevant to their constituency. The best
8

way to increase this chance is through committee assignments in the relevant policy
areas. In turn, the committees enjoy oversight over specific agencies. Moe (1987)
points out that these committees have jurisdiction over agency budgets and enjoy
close relationships with agency personnel. Fiorina (1977) says this causes
‘symbiotic (or interdependent) relationships’ to develop between federal agencies
and congressional committees and subcommittees because the bureaucrats
acknowledge that their success depends upon satisfying congressional interests, so
they provide benefits to Congress.
The theory has been elaborated to say that Congress also dominates because
of institutionalized exchanges of influence and agenda management. Weingast
(1988) argues that the committee system has institutionalized exchanges of
influence so that members do not need to trade votes per se. Holcombe (1991)
contends that the institutionalization is effective. He says the committees and the
seniority system of assignments subdivide property rights causing the agenda to be
better managed. While effective, the committee system intensifies electoral
incentives, because the theory is still based on the legislators’ motivation to be
reelected.
Finally, public discourse often uses partisan politics in Congress to explain
the distribution of funds because the party that holds the majority in Congress
controls the power of the purse. However, this is not always the case. To see if this
was true, Balla (2002) analyzed the politics of appropriations earmarks to
institutions of higher education between 1995 and 2000. He claimed there is a
collective action problem in appropriating funds because members of the majority
9

and minority parties would like to secure money for their constituencies but would
like to avoid being blamed for wastefulness. Balla confirmed his claim and found
that the majority party gave the minority party some money; this finding supports
his blame avoidance explanation. Another factor that mitigates partisan politics is
spillover effects between congressional districts. Levitt and Snyder (1997) point
out that because the benefits of grants are not restricted within district lines, state
delegations or members from the same region work together, across party lines, to
advocate for grant awards. Therefore, spillover effects and blame avoidance leave
party politics as a poor explanation for why funds are awarded by Congress. In sum,
the congressional dominance theory contends that the incentive to be reelected, the
exchange of influence, agenda management, and the symbiotic relationship with
agencies cause Congress to control federal agencies and ultimately resource
distribution.

Electoral Vote Maximization Theory
In contrast to the theory that Congress has influence over the allocation of
government expenditures and the bureaucracy, the electoral vote maximization
theory assigns significant influence to the president and the executive branch.
Wright (1974) and Bertelli and Grose (2009) agree that the president influences
allocations. Wright argues that “interstate inequalities in per capita federal
spending can be explained in large part as a result of a process of (the president)
maximizing expected electoral votes,” (Wright 30). To test the theory, Wright
examined the allocation of jobs by state by the Works Progress Administration in
10

the New Deal. His analysis included variables reflecting economic distress (fall in
income, per capita relief, and unemployment) as well as political factors (electoral
votes per capita, standard deviation of Democratic share, and an index of political
productivity) of 48 states. He found that jobs were allocated as a result of the
interaction between political and economic forces because political productivity, the
standard deviation of Democratic share, unemployment rate, and relief cases shared
statistically significant relationships with work-relief jobs in either the 1936 or the
1940 model.
Similarly, Bertelli and Grose (2009) find that the president plays an
important role. One of three hypotheses tested in the study was “as the electoral
competitiveness of a state in the presidential election increases (decreases), the
amount of grant dollars allocated to that state likewise increases (decreases). If
grants are allocated to safe constituencies, this relationship will be reversed,”
(Bertelli 932). Bertelli and Grose use Department of Labor (DOL) discretionary
grant outlays and Department of Defense (DOD) procurement contracts from 19922002 as dependent variables in two models to determine what influenced the
allocation to states. The results found that the presidential election competitiveness
of a state (measured by the number of electoral votes in that state divided by the
absolute margin between the two major party presidential candidates in the
previous election) shared a negative and statistically significant relationship with
grant outlays from the DOL. The negative relationship signifies that the DOL grants
rewarded the president’s supporters and not competitive electoral states. However,
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the same was not true for DOD contracts so generalizability across all federal
agencies was not achieved in the study.
In contrast, Hamman (1997) assessed the processing time for Urban Mass
Transit Administration discretionary capital assistance grants during the NixonFord, Carter, and Reagan administrations to analyze whether presidents influence
bureaucrats to distribute funds to enhance their reelection chances. They analyzed
political variables (election year, presidential support, grant size, and congressional
committee membership and seniority,) and found Congress and bureaucrats better
explain distributive politics. They concluded by saying that while presidents do not
explain the amount of allocations, they may influence bureaucrats with regard to the
timing of assistance grants.

Applied Analyses
Finally, three studies on stimulus fund allocation, one from the New Deal and
two from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, are relevant to my
research. First, Anderson (1991) applied the aforementioned theories to examine
what determined the allocation of resources in the New Deal. Anderson analyzed
the determinants of the $27.4 billion dollars of federal spending in the New Deal
between 1933 and 1939, which were largely supposed to be allocated according to
economic need. Unlike other studies, he controlled for the number of highway
miles, the amount of federal land, and the farm value of the states in addition to the
usual unemployment, state income, committee assignments, and congressional
tenure variables to test his hypotheses. The results of six models found that political
12

factors played a role. In particular, the tenure of the senators and representatives
on the appropriations committee and the electoral votes per capita in the states
were important. Also, the economic situation in the states had a weak relationship
with the New Deal program allocations. Anderson’s analysis suggests that New Deal
spending was partially motivated by need and partly by political influence.
More recently, Gimpel et al. (2010) reviewed similar literature to examine
the geographic distribution of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
spending. The analysis was done at the county level across all fifty states and tested
two explanations of why the government fails to distribute resources according to
need. First, they believe that political and institutional factors such as legislative
leadership, presidential influence, and majority parties can explain why funds are
allocated. Second, Gimpel cites John Kingdon’s policy process theory that problems,
policy solutions, and politics come together—at times haphazardly—to form policy
when windows of opportunity present themselves to policymakers. They claim that
legislators used the economic crisis as a policy window and took the opportunity to
seek funding for their constituencies. They found that funds were poorly targeted to
economic need. There is potential bias in their analysis because 1) they left out the
state capital counties and 2) they fail to distinguish if the allocations to counties
were distributed at the federal or state level. This distinction is important because
it could be that state governments failed to distribute funds by need, not the Federal
government.
Young and Sobel (2010) examine what factors affect the ARRA allocations at
the state level for both agency-reported data (funds announced, funds made
13

available, funds paid out) and recipient-reported data (funds awarded and funds
received) between February 2009 and April 2010. They accounted for
demographic, economic, and political variables but with 17 predictors and only 50
observations they ran separate models based on these categories. In the main
regression that incorporated variables from each, Young and Sobel found
population, federal aid from 2008, the average tenure of members serving in the
House of Representatives and Senate, and whether Obama won in 2008 to be
statistically significant. However, only population was statistically significant across
all five types of fund measures and the Senate tenure had a negative effect. In all,
they conclude that it was a poorly designed countercyclical policy because the gross
domestic product and unemployment variables were not significant. However, this
analysis can be improved upon because only a portion of the funds were awarded at
the time it was written and the significance of the variables vary among the five
types of allocations, so the results lack explanatory power.
In sum, the literature shows that federal fund allocation determinants vary
across time just as stakeholders, public opinion, and economic conditions change
over time. The literature and previous models direct my statistical inquiry on the
determinants of the funds awarded by agency for the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act.

14

IV. Research Design
My null hypothesis (H0) is that unemployment, income, tax effort, and
congressional and presidential political variables have no effect on ARRA funds
awarded by agency per capita. Funds are defined per capita because a neutral
allocation would not be equal across states, rather it would be equal across people.
The alternative hypothesis (H1) is that these variables have an effect on how ARRA
funds were awarded by agency per capita. The federal source agencies of the
awards to the fifty states serve as the primary units of analysis in my model. Prior
to my analysis, I expected to reject the null hypothesis, as the literature suggests
that federal fund allocation is not only determined by need because other political
and economic differences matter.

Data Collection
The total funds awarded by agency per capita at the state level will serve as
the dependent variable in my model because it is the outcome of interest. I collected
these data from recovery.gov in cumulative amounts by state between February 17,
2009 and December 31, 2011 and disaggregated them by agency. When I accessed
the data, they were current as of February 29, 2012. Recovery information is
reported in agency and recipient formats and I use recipient reported data because
it includes the dollar amounts collected from recipients of federal contract, grant,
and loan awards. The agency reported data includes the entitlements and tax
benefits, which are not the focus of my research. The data were collected and
organized into a panel dataset with an observation being a state and an agency.
15

Thirty-four federal agencies allocated money to the states in ARRA; therefore my
sample size has 1700 observations (50 states by 34 agencies).
My model also controls for a common series of economic and political
variables. The majority of this model replicates the design that Dr. Andrew T. Young
used in his 2010 paper “Recovery and Reinvestment Act Spending at the State Level:
Keynesian Stimulus or Distributive Politics?”15 However, my model disaggregates
the total funds to analyze total funds by agency and instead of including population
as an independent variable, I account for it by using funds per capita. I do this
because larger states clearly received more money, but the question is whether they
received more per person.
First, the January 2009 seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, determined
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/,16 is included in the model to
determine if the level of unemployment affected the amount of awards a state
received. I predict the unemployment rate will share a positive relationship with
funds awarded because the goal of the Stimulus was to reduce the effects of the
recession on the population. Then, the state tax revenue growth as a percentage
increase or decrease between FY2007 and FY2008 cited from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s 2007 and 2008 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections is
included to account for the condition of tax revenue in the states. I expect this will
share a negative relationship with funds awarded because higher revenue growth

15

Dr. Andrew Young of the University of West Virginia was kind enough to share his dataset ‘Public Choice’ used for his 2010
publication “Recovery and Reinvestment Act Spending at the State Level: Keynesian Stimulus or Distributive Politics?” for use on my
Capstone. All sources listed are where they originally came from.
16
See Appendix A for BLS definitions of seasonally adjusted unemployment rate.
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may indicate that the state was less affected by the recession, had strong tax
collection efforts, or maintained a strong tax base.
Then, the per capita gross domestic product for 2008 measured in real
dollars—which adjusts for inflation based on national prices for goods and services
within each state—is included in the model. The average change in state gross
domestic product between 2006 and 2008, measured as a percent increase or
decrease is also included. Data were collected using the Bureau of Economic
Analysis Gross Domestic Product by State Interactive Map application.17
Finally, the total amount of grants and payments that the states received
from the federal government in 2008 is also controlled for because incremental
budgeting theory suggests that aid received last year affects how much is allocated
this year. It also gives a better indication of the relationship between the severity of
the earlier part of the recession and the relief the states received prior to ARRA.
This measure can also be interpreted as the state’s previous ability to capture
federal aid, so including it in the model is important. The measure was provided by
the Census Bureau.
The economic variables must be controlled for in the model because they
may explain the amount of funds awarded by agency. If the Stimulus was based on
need, states experiencing slower growth would receive more funds.
Then, congressional and presidential variables are included in the model to
test the theories of congressional dominance and electoral vote maximization. To
control for the effect of seniority and experience, the average tenure by state of

17

Gross Domestic Product by State (GDP by State) Interactive Map. http://www.bea.gov/regional/gdpmap/.
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members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate serving in the 111th
Congress is included from the data provided by Young (2010). Level of tenure can
correlate with important committee assignments and lack of party competition in
the home district or state. Hence, I predict that a state with a higher average tenure
would be better off competing for funds in ARRA. Then, variables for the number of
Representatives and Senators who serve on the appropriations committees by state
was accessed from www.nationaljournal.com and included in the model. The
congressional dominance theory suggests that membership on an appropriations
committee influences the allocation of federal outlays so I predict these will have
positive relationships with the amount of funds awarded. Initial testing of the
appropriations subcommittee memberships found no relationship with the
dependent variable and collinearity with other political and economic factors and
therefore they were not included in the final model.
Political variables associated with the president are included because
according to the electoral vote maximization theory and Young (2010), a president
may allocate resources to either reward states for their support in past elections or
to influence them for future elections. A dummy variable is included for whether
President Obama won the state in the 2008 presidential election. Then, I used a
measure called the ‘presidential election competitiveness’ using Bertelli’s (2009)
formula. The measure is the number of electoral votes in the state divided by the
absolute margin—measured as a percentage—between the two major party
candidates in the 2008 presidential election (Obama and McCain). Large values
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indicate significant battleground states and smaller values indicate uncompetitive
states or states with few electoral votes.
For example, Missouri has 11 electoral votes, and Obama won 49.3% of the
popular vote while McCain won 49.4%, allowing for a very small margin and a total
PEC equal to 8725. Then, California has 55 electoral votes, but Obama won 61% of
the popular vote and McCain won 37%. Therefore, the PEC for California is 228,
much smaller than Missouri’s, even though there are a lot more electoral votes at
stake there. According to Bertelli, this effect should be positive if grants are
allocated to important, electoral battleground states (like Missouri), but negative if
the President’s electoral goals are met by rewarding states having offered strong
previous support (like California). I expect the administration used spending to
reward the states that voted for Obama in 2008 and were strongly supportive, like
California. Hence, I anticipate a positive and negative relationship for these
presidential predictors respectively. The presidential election information was
provided by the Federal Election Commission at www.fec.gov.
I believe that these variables are all reliable measures (not subject to any
significant measurement error) of the phenomena I wish to control for in the model
because they are not based on random components and they come from
government sources. All definitions and links to data sources can be found in the
References section.
Table 1 provides the descriptions of all the variables included in the final
model with their abbreviations, descriptions, expected signs, and sources.
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions

Research Model
Instead of using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models for each of
the thirty-four agencies to observe the effects, I created a panel dataset. Panel data
observe the dependent variables across time for a set of units, here states, more
than once. In my case, the states are observed repeatedly for various federal
agencies. The sample size of my analysis is the number of agencies, 34, times the
number of states, 50, so the total number of observations is 1700. The dependent
variable, y, is now funds awarded by a particular agency in a particular state,
expressed per capita.
Organizing the data as a panel allowed me to use a fixed-effects regression
model, which holds constant (or fixes) the average effects for each agency. By doing
this, I controlled for the average differences across agencies in observable and
unobservable ways, most importantly the large size differences, therefore leaving
behind the within-agency differences. This helps to reduce the threat of omitted
variable bias and prevent large agencies from dominating the estimation. So, if the
20

funds awarded were equal across all states then the dependent variable would not
vary across states but it would across agencies because they vary in size.

The model is specified as:
Yia =  0 + 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 + 4X4 + 5X5 + 6X6 + 7X7 + 8X8 +  9X9 + 10X10 + 11X11 + αa + 
Where Yia denotes the funds awarded to a particular state i for agency a, X 1 – X11 represent the eleven
independent variables, α is the fixed effect of the agency, representing size, purpose, and other fixed
characteristics, and  denotes the random error in the model.

Table 2 provides the summary

statistics for all of the independent variables in the model.
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable
Total funds awarded by agency
per capita (dollars per capita)
January 2009 Seasonally Adjusted
Unemployment Rate (percentage)
Tax revenue growth from 2007 to
2008 (percentage)
Real per capita gross domestic
product in 2008 (dollars per
capita)
Average GDP growth in the states
between 2006 to 2008
(percentage)
Per capita federal aid to state and
local governments in 2008
(dollars per capita)
Average House tenure (years)
Average Senate tenure (years)
Number of Senators on the Full
Committee on Appropriations
Number of Representatives on the
Full Committee on Appropriations
Presidential election
competitiveness
Voted for Obama in 2008 (dummy
variable either 0 or 1)
Obs= Number of Observations
St. Dev= Standard Deviation

Obs

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

50

$21.37

$26.26

$0.00

$126.74

50

7.16%

1.80%

3.70%

11.60%

50

4.31%

9.10%

-6.80%

59.13%

50

$ 36,408.00 $ 6,520.95 $ 24,403.65 $ 56,401.84

50

50
50
50

0.70%

$

1.69 $
8.00
12.09

1.59%

0.65 $
5.71
8.61

-2.27%

0.99 $
0
0

6.77%

4.38
36.00
37.00

50

0.5800

0.4985

0

1

50

1.3200

1.5964

0

7

50

348.46

1286.96

8.84

8725.00

50

0.5800

0.4985

0

1
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IV. Results
Based on the results presented in Table 3, the model shows that four
variables have a significant influence on the funds awarded by agency per capita.
First, if the awards are equal per person across all states, ‘y’ would not vary across
states. But it would vary across agencies, because they vary in size from small to
large. In my analysis, I find that the allocation is not equal across states.
Table 3. Results

First, the state tax revenue growth as a percentage increase or decrease
between FY2007 and FY2008 shares a positive and statistically significant

22

relationship with agency funds awarded at the 0.01 level. For every one percent
increase in state tax revenue growth between 2007 and 2008, the total funds
awarded by agency per capita increased by $0.76. I expected the relationship to be
negative, or at least statistically insignificant, and this is not the case. The results
indicate that states that were in better conditions as far as tax collection efforts
received more money from ARRA than states that experienced poor tax collection
efforts.
Next, the total amount of grants and payments that the states received from
the federal government in 2008 also shares a positive and statistically significant
relationship with stimulus funds at the 0.01 level. The results show that for every
one dollar increase in federal aid per capita in 2008, funds awarded by agency per
capita increased by $5.60. This was not surprising as I expected that states who had
previously received substantial federal aid, due to need or from previous political
extraction ability, would also receive awards in ARRA.
The results also indicate that the number of representatives on the House full
committee on appropriations shares a negative and statistically significant
relationship with the total funds awarded by agency per capita at the 0.01 level. For
every one member increase in the number of representatives on the committee,
funds awarded by agency per capita decreased by $2.13. This is opposite of the
congressional dominance theory prediction, that appropriations committee
assignments help politicians distribute resources to their constituencies.
Finally, the presidential election competitiveness shares a negative and
statistically significant relationship with the total funds awarded by agency per
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capita. The standard deviation for this measure (1286), multiplied by the coefficient
(-0.000741), indicates that for every one standard deviation change in the PEC,
funds awarded by agency per capita decreases by $0.95. This measure is significant
at the 0.01 level. I expected this variable to share a negative relationship because
Bertelli says a negative relationship means that the president’s electoral goals were
met by rewarding the states that had the least pay off electorally, previously offered
strong support, or were small states. It is logical that he rewarded recent
supporters because the ARRA fund awards were given just months after the election
and years away from the next presidential election.
Some of the variables that I expected to have a significant influence on the
funds awarded did not. For example, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate
and the real per capita gross domestic product were insignificant in determining
where the money was awarded. The major goals of the ARRA were to create and
save jobs and spur economic activity, so I expected funds to be targeted towards the
hardest hit states, and this is not what the results show. Also, the average tenure of
the Representatives and Senators in states were insignificant which I thought would
have a significant impact on where money was awarded because I thought seniority
would enhance a state’s ability to compete for funds.

Discussion
To answer my question, if politics or economics mattered in determining
ARRA awards, I must consider the substance of the results. But this is a matter of
interpretation because the significance of the coefficients has different meanings to
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different audiences. For example, a predicted $2.13 decrease in awards by agency
per capita given one more representative on the appropriations committee by state
may appear to be insignificant. But if the state has a population of 5 million people,
this translates into $10.65 million less than a state with one less representative and
the same population. To me, these results are substantively insignificant and
counterintuitive because congressional dominance theory suggests that
representatives request appropriations committee assignments due to the power of
the purse. Yet, I can also interpret this result as possible validation of the blame
avoidance theory. In this light, representatives on the appropriations committee
might have (although unlikely) diverted funds from their districts to avoid
accusations that they allocated funds unfairly.
Overall, the political variables of whether Obama won in 2008 and the tenure
in the House and Senate did not matter. What did matter was the representation on
the House appropriations committee, but it had a negative effect on funds awarded
as mentioned. The negative relationship between funds and competitiveness of the
state has several interpretations so the substantive significance is harder to
determine. It can be interpreted that Obama’s electoral goals were met as a result of
1) rewarding states that strongly supported him in 2008, 2) rewarding small states,
or 3) rewarding states with the least pay off electorally. No matter the explanation,
a decrease of $0.95 per capita lacks substance when you compare it to the billions
awarded in the Stimulus.
Economically, the gross domestic product measures for states and
individuals and unemployment rates were not statistically significant so ARRA
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awards do not seem to have been a response to need. The tax revenue growth result
can be interpreted in this way.
To illustrate, for every one percent increase in a state’s tax revenue growth
between 2007 and 2008, the total funds awarded by agency per capita increased by
$0.76. Using a similar metric, if a state with a population of 5 million people grew its
tax revenues by one percent between 2007 and 2008, it received $3.83 million more
than a state with one less percent growth in revenue with the same population. This
indicates that the rich states, relative in terms of marginal tax revenue growth in
that year, got richer. This may be a result of 1) a state’s strong ability to collect taxes
from their constituency, 2) a state’s relative tax base growth, or 3) a state’s capacity
to absorb or collect federal grants, loans, and contracts and carry out projects. The
results do not distinguish between these explanations, but regardless, the Stimulus
rewarded states for their tax effort.
Because of the variation of explanations, some may argue that the economic
measures included do not correlate with a state’s capacity to save or create jobs and
to spur economic activity. Given that these were the goals of the Recovery Act, the
states that were worse off may not have been the policymakers’ perceived best
place to award scarce funds. Nonetheless, the economic variables that did matter
were the federal aid per capita and tax revenue growth. The federal aid per capita is
consistent with Wildavsky’s theory of incrementalism because agency awards are
partly explained by last year’s allocation. While $5.56 more per capita is the largest
magnitude among the statistically significant variables, it is also not a controversial
finding and was expected.
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In sum, four economic and political variables are statistically significant in
the model but they lack substantive significance in dollar terms. The majority of the
variation in funds awarded is explained by agencies. The fixed-effects analysis gave
a rho value of 0.749, indicating that 74.9% of the variance is due to, or explained by,
the differences across agencies. This is not surprising, as agencies vary in size.
Therefore, economics and politics did not matter in practical terms but should not
be discounted given the strength of the analysis. Regardless of interpretation, I
hope that the findings have added to the literature on the legislation and encourage
future research.

Defense of Results
The empirical results have descriptive power because the methodology I use
preserves internal validity so I am confident that I have uncovered causal effects of
the variables. The F value is <0.001, which shows that some of the coefficients in the
model are statistically significantly different from zero and things unique to each
agency are quite important.
My results are generalizable within the United States because I included all
fifty states and their characteristics in my analysis. However, the results are not
generalizable to other times and settings because the stakeholders involved in
policymaking are always changing and this analysis only regards the ARRA as of
February 29, 2012.
The fixed-effects model yields lower standard errors than would otherwise
be observed in ordinary least squares because it is only using the within-agency
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variation. In my model I clustered by state. This corrects for the shared variance
arising from repeated observation of states, i.e. non-independent observations.
The fixed-effects of the agencies allow for interpretation that the remaining
coefficients and p-values have descriptive power. The methodology and
characteristics of the model allow me to say with confidence that it is unlikely that I
got these p-values and t-statistics with the means, null effects, and standard errors
in a world where the null hypothesis is true. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis
that unemployment, income, tax effort, and congressional and presidential political
variables have no effect on ARRA funds awarded by agency per capita. The complete
regression results with agency descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A.

V. Conclusion
The results of my analysis show that state tax revenue growth between 2007
and 2008, federal aid per capita in 2008, number of representatives on the full
Committee on Appropriations, and the presidential election competitiveness predict
the total funds awarded to states by agency per capita in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009. However, these findings lack substantive significance in
dollar terms and the majority of the variation in awards is explained by differences
in agencies.

Caveats and Limitations
Like any analysis, there are limitations and caveats. A limitation of my
analysis is the selection of measures and variables included in my model. I collected
data on levels and year to year changes for most of the economic variables and ran
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correlation tests on them. The correlation tests measured the strength and
direction of the linear relationships between variables. For example, the correlation
between the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in 2009 and the change in
unemployment rates between 2008 and 2009 was 0.8895. Based on this high
correlation, I only included the seasonally adjusted measure in the final model.
Different combinations of measures on unemployment, income, and tax revenue
growth might produce different results.
There are likely other variables that were not included in the model that
could explain the total awards by agency, namely agency characteristics and the job
creation ability of states. I did not include agency characteristics as predictors
because the congressional dominance theory says Congress controls agencies,
therefore I only included Congressional predictors. I also controlled for observable
and unobservable agency characteristics using the fixed effects model but this does
not account for all agency factors. Then, an ideal variable to include in my model
would be a measure of a state’s capacity to save or create jobs and to spur economic
activity. Such measures do not exist at a state aggregated level. If they did, they may
explain if the distribution of funds was based on the stated goals of the Act better
than the other economic independent variables.
Finally, a dataset that disaggregates the funds awarded by year and agency
between 2009 and 2011, not just the overall total, would have created a better panel
data set. This would also require using data and predictors that match the funds
awarded year to year such as committee assignment changes and House and Senate
seat changes from the 2010 midterm elections.
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Opportunities for Future Research
There are many opportunities for future research. One would be to create
the disaggregated (by year) panel dataset mentioned and use models similar to
those used here.
Another avenue for research would be to study state legislatures in relation
to ARRA. I only focused on the legislative and executive branch of the Federal
government. The dynamics between state governors and Federal agencies, state
government and the president, or internal state determinants of ARRA awards
would be interesting to investigate.
Using the number of awards, total funds received, or job creation as
dependent variables would be another possibility to explore in the future.
Ultimately, the third goal of the Recovery Act, ‘to foster unprecedented levels of
accountability and transparency in Recovery spending’ was accomplished and will
make future research possible because of the amount and detail of the data
publically disclosed on recovery.gov.
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Appendix
A.
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables and Fixed Agencies
Y
January 2009 Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate
Tax revenue growth from 2007 to 2008
Real per capita gross domestic product in 2008
Average GDP growth in the states between 2006 to 2008

Coef.

Err.

T-stat P-value 95% Conf. Int.

100.16 71.99

1.39

0.17 -44.51 244.83

76.55 15.23

5.03

0.00

0.00

0.14

0.89

94.59 82.71

1.14

0.26 -71.62 260.80

0.00

45.95 107.15
0.00

0.00

Per capita federal aid to state and local governments in 2008

5.60

2.09

2.68

0.01

1.40

9.79

Average House tenure

0.29

0.25

1.14

0.26

-0.22

0.80

Average Senate tenure

-0.04

0.11

-0.39

0.70

-0.25

0.17

Presidential election competitiveness

0.00

0.00

-3.06

0.00

0.00

0.00

Voted for Obama in 2008

0.37

2.47

0.15

0.88

-4.59

5.33

Number of Senators on the Full Committee on Appropriations

0.65

2.33

0.28

0.78

-4.04

5.34

-2.13

0.64

-3.35

0.00

-3.41

-0.85

4.86

Number of Representatives on the Full Committee on Appropriations
Totall ARRA Funds Awarded by:
Corps of Engineers

3.71

1.31

0.20

-2.59

12.32

Department of Agriculture

50.98 10.08

5.06

0.00

30.73

71.23

Department of Commerce

12.39

3.90

3.18

0.00

4.56

20.23

Department of Defense (except military departments)

-13.18

1.40

-9.44

0.00 -15.98 -10.37

Department of Education

259.25

8.53

30.39

0.00 242.11 276.40

Department of Energy

128.52 15.37

8.36

0.00

97.64 159.40

Department of Health and Human Services

75.32 10.69

7.05

0.00

53.85

Department of Homeland Security

-5.77

2.21

-2.61

Department of Housing and Urban Development

21.58

2.68

Department of Labor

-0.48

Department of State

-14.59

Department of the Air Force
Department of the Army

96.80

0.01 -10.22

-1.32

8.05

0.00

16.19

26.97

1.33

-0.36

0.72

-3.16

2.19

1.73

-8.42

0.00 -18.07 -11.10

-3.56

3.95

-0.90

0.37 -11.50

-3.51

3.90

-0.90

0.37 -11.35

7.75

6.07

1.28

-11.73

2.13

-9.55

5.64

Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs

Department of the Interior
Department of the Navy
Department of the Treasury

0.21

4.39
4.32

-4.46

19.95

-5.52

0.00 -16.00

-7.46

-1.69

0.10 -20.88

1.78

159.53 11.82

13.50

0.00 135.78 183.29
0.00 -13.01

-7.42

0.00

23.32

-10.21

1.39

-7.34

Environmental Protection Agency

18.06

2.62

6.90

Executive Office of the President

-16.51

1.38 -11.93

0.00 -19.29 -13.73

Federal Communications Commission

-16.31

1.40 -11.62

0.00 -19.13 -13.49

3.05

0.62

General Services Administration

1.52

0.50

12.80

-4.61

7.64

Government Accountability Office

-16.48

1.38 -11.90

0.00 -19.26 -13.70

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

-13.83

1.94

0.00 -17.72

National Foundation on the Appropriations Arts and the Humanities

-16.27

1.37 -11.88

0.00 -19.03 -13.52

4.82

0.67 -11.76

-7.14

National Science Foundation

-2.08

Other Independent Agencies

-16.02

1.39 -11.52

0.00 -18.82 -13.23

Small Business Administration

-16.14

1.39 -11.59

0.00 -18.94 -13.34

Smithsonian Institution

-16.49

1.38 -11.91

0.00 -19.27 -13.71

Social Security Administration

-16.33

1.39 -11.75

0.00 -19.13 -13.54

The Legislative Branch

-16.48

1.39 -11.90

0.00 -19.26 -13.70

U.S. Agency for International Development

-16.40

1.40 -11.70

0.00 -19.21 -13.58

U.S. Tax Court

-16.51

1.38 -11.93

0.00 -19.29 -13.73

Constant

-4.32 10.11

-0.43

-9.93

-0.43

0.67 -24.63

7.59

15.99

Coef = coeffi ci ent
Err = Robus t Sta nda rd Error
T-s ta t = t-s ta ti s ti c
95% Conf. Int. = 95% Confi dence Interva l
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